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I. INTRODUCTION
This article compares federalist institutions and experiences
in the six countries in the Western Hemisphere that have for-
mally adopted federal systems of government. While other
American countries or groups of countries, such as Chile (1826-
1827), Honduras (1824-1831), the United Provinces of Central
America (1829-1838), and Colombia (1853-1886), had short-lived
experiences with federalism, only six countries in the Americas
have lengthy federalist traditions: Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Mexico, the United States ("U.S."), and Venezuela.' It is not
coincidental that five of these six countries are also the largest
in the Western Hemisphere.! Because federalism grants region-
al units significant political and economic autonomy, it has been
an extremely useful system for governing large land masses
with diverse regions and populations.
1. Characterization of Venezuela as a nation with a long federalist tradition
requires qualification. Since 1811, Venezuelan constitutions have adopted a formal
federalist structure, but the expansion of federal powers has left the states with
such limited powers that some commentators have characterized Venezuela as a
pseudo-federalist nation. E.g., JACQUES LAMBERT, LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE
AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 300 (1967); WIENAZYSTAW J. WAGNER, THE FEDERAL
STATES AND THEIR JUDICIARY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS OF FEDERAL STATES 46-47 (1959); Harry Kantor, Latin
American Federalism: Aspiration and Futility, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 185, 202-203 (Valerie Earle ed., 1968). Reforms enacted in
1989, particularly those permitting direct election of state governors instead of presi-
dential appointment, have made Venezuela more genuinely federalist. See Steve
Ellner, Deepening of Democracy in a Crisis Setting: Political Reforms and the Elector-
al Process in Venezuela, 35 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 1, 16-22 (No. 4, 1993-
94).
2. Canada has an area of 9,922,300 square kilometers; the U.S., 9,371,781 sq.
kms.; Brazil, 8,511,965 sq. kms.; Argentina, 2,766,889 sq. kms.; and Mexico,
1,972,547 sq. kms. On the other hand, Venezuela, with an area of 912,050 sq. kms.,
is smaller than three Western Hemisphere countries: Peru (1,285,216 sq. kms.), Co-
lombia (1,138,914 sq. kms.), and Bolivia (1,098,581 sq. kms.). NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC,
ATLAS OF THE WORLD 68, 100, 113, 120-121 (5th ed. 1981).
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The federalist traditions of Canada and the U.S., although
they differ in various important respects, are quite distinct from
those of Latin America. Canada and the U.S. were colonized by
Great Britain, which allowed its colonies substantial freedom in
governing themselves.3 In both countries, federalism was per-
ceived as a useful technique for integrating substantially autono-
mous colonies into a single nation. Latin America, on the other
hand, was colonized by Spain and Portugal, whose heavily cen-
tralized regimes permitted their colonies little freedom to govern
their own affairs. In Latin America, federalism was perceived as
a means to decentralize governments that had been heavily con-
centrated. Both the U.S. and Canada, with the exception of
Quebec, were products of colonizations that synthesized Protes-
tantism, Locke's social compact theory, and the natural rights of
Englishmen.4 This North American inheritance of theology and
political theory was far more conducive to the structured dis-
persal of power among many regional centers than Latin
America's inheritance of the centralized, hierarchical organiza-
tion of Roman Catholicism and Bourbon absolutism. It should
not be surprising, therefore, that power in all the Latin Ameri-
can federal nations is far more centralized than in Canada or
the U.S.
A. The Essential Features of Federalism
Despite the vast literature on the subject, federalism's es-
sential nature remains elusive.5 Since the framers of the U.S.
3. Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and
Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 9-
10 (1990); W.R. Lederman, The Extension of Governmental Institutions and Legal
Systems to British North America in the Colonial Period, in CONTINUING CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS: ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, PUBLIC LAw
AND FEDERAL SYSTEM OF CANADA 63, 64-77 (W.R. Lederman ed. 1981).
4. For the importance of the Protestant, particularly Calvinist, theological
underpinnings for the development of federal democracy in the U.S. colonies, see
Daniel J. Elazar & Ilan Greilsammer, Federal Democracy: The U.SA and Europe
Compared A Political Science Perspective, in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE
AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 71, 77-79 (Mauro Cappelletti, Monica
Seccombe & Joseph Weiler eds., 1986) [hereinafter INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW]. See
also Bernard J.S. Hoetje6, The European Tradition of Federalism: The Protestant
Dimension, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION: COMPETING TRADITIONS
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 117 (Michael Burgess & Alain-G. Gagnon eds., 1993).
5. L.J. BOULLE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE APARTHEID STATE: LEGITI-
MACY, CONSOCIATIONALISM AND CONTROL IN SOUTH AFRICA 51 (1984); Richard P.
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Constitution of 1787 invented modern federalism, theorists have
tended to regard the basic federalist features of the U.S. Consti-
tution as the essence of federalism.6 There are, however, several
types of federalist systems,7 many of which differ from the U.S.
model in important ways. Nevertheless, the essential character-
istics of federalism can be reduced to two: (1) constitutional
division of powers between the central and regional levels of
government, and (2) entrenched regional representation in the
central government.8 Federalism is a form of government in
which sovereign powers are constitutionally divided between a
central government and geographically defined, semi-autono-
mous levels of government. Generally, federalist constitutions
allocate powers to large geographically defined units, such as
states, provinces, cantons or ldnder, but a few also allocate gov-
ernmental powers to smaller subdivisions such as federal dis-
tricts, counties or municipalities. Typically, some powers are
exercised exclusively by the central government, some are exer-
cised exclusively by the states or counties, and some are exer-
cised concurrently. Nothing in the concept of federalism, howev-
er, other than a vague notion that national government should
Nathan, Defining Modern Federalism, in NORTH AMERICAN COMPARATIVE FEDERAL-
ISM: ESSAYS FOR THE 1990S 89, 90 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992) [hereinafter COM-
PARAIVE FEDERALISM].
6. See, e.g., Arend Lijphart, Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of
Federal and Consociational Theories, 15 PuBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 3, 4-
5 (Spring 1985) (identifying the following five secondary characteristics of federalism:
(1) a written constitution dividing powers between the central and regional govern-
ments, (2) a bicameral legislature with one chamber representing the people and the
other chamber the regional units, (3) over-representation of smaller regional units in
the upper house, (4) regional units having the rights to be involved in amending the
federal constitution and to change their own constitutions unilaterally, and (5) a
decentralized government with the regional governments' having a share of power
that is relatively large compared with regional governments in unitary states).
7. As of 1987, there were 19 federalist nations, with 40 percent of the world's
population; 58 nations had some form of institutional arrangements based upon fed-
eral principles. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 42 (1987).
8. Some political scientists contend that a third essential characteristic of fed-
eralism is that states or provinces are prohibited from seceding from the federal
union. Elazar & Greilsammer, supra note 4, at 101; Carl J. Friedrich, Admission of
New States, Territorial Adjustments, and Secession, in STUDIES IN FEDERALISM 753,
770 (Robert R. Bowie & Carl J. Friedrich eds., 1954). The indissolubility of the un-
ion is a fundamental principle of U.S. constitutional law. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700, 724-725 (1868), overruled on other grounds by Morgan v. United States,
113 U.S. 476, 496 (1885). Yet it would not have this status had the South won the
Civil War. If Quebec were eventually successful in carrying out its threat to declare
independence, Canada would not necessarily cease to be a federal nation.
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be empowered to deal with national affairs and the state gov-
ernments with local affairs, indicates how these powers should
be divided. Hence, federal systems divide governmental powers
differently. Even within the same country and under the same
constitution, divisions of powers shift and evolve.
The second basic characteristic of federalism is that the
states or provinces have entrenched representation within the
national government.9 Federal states are almost invariably bi-
cameral. Representation in the lower house is usually appor-
tioned on the basis of population, but many guarantee each state
or province equal representation in the upper house. Argentina
and Brazil go one step further; the city of Buenos Aires and
Brazil's Federal District are each entitled to elect three senators,
the same representation as a province or state."0 Others, such
as Canada or Germany, grant some provinces or Lander more
delegates in the upper house than others." Generally, federal
constitutions may not be amended without the consent of a ma-
jority or extraordinary majority of the states or provinces. 2 The
U.S. Constitution goes further, categorically prohibiting any
constitutional amendment from depriving any state without its
consent of equal suffrage in the Senate."3
B. The Advantages of Federalism
Federalism has a number of advantages as a form of politi-
cal organization. The most obvious reason for sovereign entities
to form a federal nation is mutual protection against outside
forces. Federalism facilitates the common defense. Second, it
promotes economic growth through free internal trade, a single
currency, freedom of travel, and reciprocal promises to enforce
9. PRESTON KING, FEDERALISM AND FEDERATION 142-43 (1982).
10. ARG. CONST. art. 54 (as amended 1994); BRAZ. CONST art. 46 (1).
11. CAN. CONST. ACT, art. 22 (1867); GERMAN BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ) art.
51.
12. Brazil and Argentina are exceptions. The Brazilian Constitution can be
amended by three-fifths majorities in both houses of the Congress in two rounds of
voting. Amendments may be proposed by a majority of the state legislatures, but
their consent is not required to approve an amendment. BRAZ. CONST. art. 60. The
Argentine Constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote of Congress, followed by
approval in a Constitutional Convention. Consent of the provinces is not required.
ARG. CONST. art. 30 (as amended 1994).
13. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the laws and judicial decisions of the component units. Third, it
helps safeguard against tyranny by preventing concentration of
governmental power and providing countervailing centers of
power." Fourth, it encourages participation in government at
local levels, promoting greater citizen involvement with the
tasks of governance. Fifth, it leads to development of new and
imaginative solutions to societal problems because local units
are more free to act as laboratories for experimentation. 15
Sixth, it simplifies the process of dealing with linguistic, ethnic,
religious, or cultural diversity, facilitating governance of large
regions and pluralistic societies. Seventh, it promotes adminis-
trative efficiency by utilizing national uniform regulations, taxa-
tion and expenditures for national concerns, while allowing local
legislatures to tailor regulations, taxation and expenditures to
regional and local concerns.
C. The Disadvantages of Federalism
Federalism also has several disadvantages. First, it is an
anachronistic form of government that makes it increasingly
difficult for modern governments to cope with issues that were
deemed local in another age but today transcend state or even
national boundaries. Second, it impedes economic efficiency by
subjecting businesses to a bewilderingly complex structure of
overlapping and inconsistent legal regulation, thereby increasing
the costs of doing business in more than one state. Third, states
often vie with each other to attract businesses, capital and popu-
lation, by enacting legislation that will be the least restrictive or
burdensome, resulting in less than optimal levels of regula-
tion. 6 Fourth, states often seek to impose external costs, like
pollution or taxes, on residents of other states." Fifth, federal-
14. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of
Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380-389.
15. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), Justice
Brandeis' dissent observed that it "is one of the happy incidents of the federal sys-
tem that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try." This widely cited dictum is generally believed to be true, but whether it is in
fact accurate is unclear. See Rapaczynski, supra note 14, at 408.
16. This creates the so-called "race to the bottom." Martin Shapiro, Federalism,
Free Movement, and Regulation-Averse Entrepreneur, in COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM,
supra note 5, at 47, 48.
17. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co.optation, 92 YALE L.
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ism creates redundancy, making the costs of governance more
expensive by adding numerous layers of bureaucracy. For exam-
ple, the U.S. has more than 83,000 governments." Sixth, state
or provincial governments are more likely to threaten the indi-
vidual rights and guarantees of minorities than national govern-
ments because local constituencies are more homogeneous and
cohesive than national ones.1" Seventh, federalism tends to be
unstable, sometimes fragmenting into several nations or requir-
ing military force to preserve the union.
Federalist systems have constant debates about the proper
boundaries between national and regional powers. Few are satis-
fied with the existing scheme, and political forces are continually
being marshalled to promote greater centralization or greater
decentralization. ° The most difficult challenge confronting any
federal system is to achieve and to maintain the appropriate
balance between the resources and responsibilities of the central
government and the resources and responsibilities of the constit-
uent state and local governments.
In the past decade, political decentralization has become an
important component of efforts to consolidate democracy in
many Latin American countries. During this period, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and
Venezuela have instituted important political reforms aimed at
J. 1344, 1345 (1983).
18. Laurence J. O'Toole, American Intergovernmental Relations: An Overview, in
AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 1, 2 (Laurence J. O'Toole ed., 2d ed.
1993). These include one federal government, 50 state governments, some 3,000
counties, 19,000 municipalities, 17,000 townships, 15,000 school districts, and nearly
29,532 special districts.
19. Rapaczynski, supra note 14, at 385-386.
20. The debate over the "centralized-decentralized" nature of Canadian federal-
ism is unending. "Many have likened it to a national sport, suggesting that whatever
solution is found to this conflict will not be the final solution because a substantial
component of the Canadian population will never support it." Gregory S. Mahler,
Canada: Two Nations, One State?, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONST1TUTIONALISM: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 56, 67 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1994).
The debate about the role and extent of states' rights versus national power is a
continual one in the U.S.. Compare JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) with Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value:
National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81. See also Martha A.
Field, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term: Comment: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985).
For recent reforms and debates about reallocation of governmental powers in Latin
American countries, see infra note 21, and accompanying text.
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transferring power and resources from the national government
to local governmental units." These reforms were motivated by
a desire to strengthen democratic institutions by dispersing
political power more widely and increasing popular access to
democratic decision-making. They were also motivated by a
belief that local application and disbursement of governmental
resources would lead to greater economic efficiency than central-
ized control.
Significant decentralization has also been taking place in
the U.S. in the past fifteen years. High on the priorities of Ron-
ald Reagan's presidency was revitalization of federalism by turn-
ing over responsibility for administering a number of federal
programs and revenue sources to the states and eliminating
much of the bureaucratic red tape surrounding federal pro-
grams.2 President Reagan, and his successor, George Bush,
also sought to revitalize federalism by appointing to the federal
judiciary a group of judges believed to be more sensitive to
states' rights.2" In 1995, the Republican-led Congress enacted
21. DECENTRALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: AN EVALUATION (Arthur Morris &
Stella Lowder eds., 1992); DESCENTRALIZACION POLITICA Y CONSOLIDACION
DEMOCRATICA (Dieter Nohlen ed., 1991). Argentine constitutional reforms adopted on
August 22, 1994, were also intended in part to strengthen federalism. These reforms
reduce the powers of the Argentine president to rule by decree in matters involving
criminal justice, taxation, elections, and political parties; presidential decrees in other
areas are subject to ratification by Congress. This measure should reduce federal
intervention in the provinces by making clear that the power to declare federal in-
tervention belongs to Congress and may not be delegated to the Executive. Only
when Congress is not in session may the president intervene on his own. The re-
forms also permit the city of Buenos Aires to elect its own mayor and
constitutionalize preexisting revenue-sharing schemes. On the other hand, the Feder-
al Senate, which is currently elected by the provincial legislatures, is likely to be-
come less responsive to provincial concerns after the year 2001, when senators will
be directly elected. This occurred in the U.S. following adoption of the 17th Amend-
ment, which instituted an identical reform. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 857-868 (1979). But
the reduction in senatorial mandates from 9 to 6 years and the addition of a third
senator from each province and the federal capital (assured to the party receiving
the second highest number of votes) may make the Senate somewhat more respon-
sive to provincial needs.
22. O'Toole, supra note 18, at 21-25; Daniel J. Elazar, Opening the Third Cen-
tury of American Federalism: Issues and Prospects, in AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE
THIRD CENTURY 11, 15-16 (John Kincaid ed., 509 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.
May 1990).
23. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and
Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on
the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294 (1991).
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legislation restricting the power of the federal government to
mandate activities by the state and local governments without
transferring federal funds to pay for these mandates.2' The re-
sults of these actions are both complex and multidirectional, but
the net result has been an important shift towards decentraliza-
tion.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF POWERS
Modern federalism began in the U.S. more than 200 years
ago, in large part as a practical solution to the problem of uni-
fying thirteen autonomous former British colonies into a govern-
ment that would permit development of a common market, while
also allowing the states to retain many of their sovereign pow-
ers.25 Federalism also complemented the doctrine of separation
of powers as an additional technique for dispersal of power,
which the Framers of the U.S. Constitution considered an impor-
tant bulwark against tyranny by the majority."
A. United States
Initially, some Framers of the U.S. Constitution suggested
that the proper formula for allocating power between the states
and the national government was simply to grant to the national
government "[1]egislative power in all cases to which the State
Legislatures were individually incompetent." 7 Eventually, the
Framers decided that it would be wiser to promulgate a complex
tripartite division of powers. One part contains a specific enu-
meration of the powers of the federal government. These eigh-
teen specifically delegated powers include the powers to tax and
spend, to borrow money, to regulate interstate and foreign com-
merce, to coin money, to protect patents and copyrights, to de-
24. John H. Cushman, Jr., "Congress Clears Limits on Rules Costly to States,"
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at Al.
25. Akhil Reed Arnar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
26. This is much less true for Canada, whose Founding Fathers subscribed to
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. Roger Gibbons, The Impact of the American
Constitution on Contemporary Canadian Politics, in THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN
CONsTrriTUIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 131, 132 n.5 (Marian C. McKenna ed.,
1993).
27. Madison's Notes on the Proceedings in the Federal Convention, May 31,
1787, 1 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911), at 53.
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clare war and raise an army, to establish uniform rules on natu-
ralization and bankruptcy, and to make all laws "necessary and
proper" to carrying out the delegated powers.28 The second part
contains a list of powers denied to the states, either absolutely
or conditioned upon obtaining permission from Congress.29 The
third part is the residual scheme. The powers of state and local
governments are not enumerated; all powers not delegated to
the federal government are reserved to the states or to the peo-
ple.3
0
The actual functioning of this tripartite division is complex.
It is a fundamental principle of U.S. constitutional law that the
federal government is one of limited powers, possessing only
those powers specifically delegated to it. Yet additional powers
can reasonably be implied from these delegated powers.3 There
is, however, no provision stating whether these specifically enu-
merated powers of the federal government are exclusive. Except
for those powers denied to the states either by the Constitution
or by federal preemption, the courts are free to infer a substan-
tial area of concurrent powers and have in fact done so. In the
U.S. the great bulk of civil, commercial, procedural, and criminal
law is state law, and the overwhelming majority of cases are
litigated in the state courts.
B. Canada
The constitutional allocation of powers in Canada is quite
different from in the U.S. Determined to correct what they
deemed a major flaw in U.S. Federalism, the weakness of the
federal government, the Framers of the Canadian Constitution
granted the national government more extensive powers than
the U.S. counterpart. Canada's national government has the
power to legislate concerning thirty-one (originally twenty-nine)
specified subjects. These include not only legislative powers
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
29. See e.g. art. 1, sec. 10, flatly prohibiting the states from issuing paper mon-
ey, entering into treaties or alliances, or making anything but gold or silver coin
legal tender, or prohibiting the states without the consent of Congress from levying
export or import duties, or keeping troops or warships during peacetime.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Kathryn Abrams, On Reading and Using the
Tenth Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 723 (1984).
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (94 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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similar to those granted to the federal government by the U.S.
Constitution,32 but also the power to regulate areas tradition-
ally regarded as reserved to the U.S. states, such as criminal
law, marriage and divorce, interest, and negotiable instru-
ments.3 The Canadian Constitution grants the provinces the
exclusive power to legislate in sixteen specified areas, including
the power to govern "property and civil rights."' Residual pow-
ers are conferred upon both the national and the provincial
governments. The national government's residual powers include
an emergency power and the power to legislate for the "Peace,
Order, and good Government of Canada" in all matters not as-
signed exclusively to the provinces;" the provincial
governments' residual power is to regulate "Generally all Mat-
ters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province."" As in
the U.S., the bulk of private law is provincial rather than federal
law.
The Canadian Constitution also contains certain extraordi-
nary provisions giving the federal government significant powers
to control the provinces, even in areas allocated exclusively to
the provinces. Thus, the federal government appoints each
province's chief executive officer, the lieutenant governor. The
lieutenant governor, either subject to orders from the governor
general or on his own discretion, has a temporary veto power
called "reservation," which permits him to refuse to consent to
any provincial bill, thereby preventing it from becoming law for
one year. The federal government also has an unqualified veto
power called "disallowance," which permits it to reject any pro-
vincial statute within one year of its enactment, even if ap-
proved by the lieutenant governor. The federal government can
declare any local undertaking for the general advantage of Can-
ada, thereby subjecting the work to federal control. Moreover,
the federal government appoints the upper levels of the provin-
cial judiciary. 7
32. These include the powers to legislate with respect to bankruptcy, patents,
copyright, trade and commerce, unemployment insurance, taxation, armed forces,
navigation, currency, and naturalization.
33. CAN. CONST. ACT art. 91 (1867).
34. Id. at art. 92.
35. Id. at art. 91 (opening paragraph).
36. Id. at art. 92(16).
37. Daniel A. Soberman, The Canadian Federal Experience--Selected Issues, in
INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, supra note 4, at 513, 515; Frank R. Scott, The Special
[Vol. 26:1
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If all these extraordinary powers were actually used by the
federal government, Canada would be far more centralized.
However, the federal powers of reservation and disallowance,
which were used frequently in Canada's early history, were last
used in 1942, and it is unlikely that they will be used again. The
approach of the past fifty years has been to leave questions
about whether provincial governments have exceeded their con-
stitutional powers to the courts.' Moreover, the national gov-
ernment has refrained from using its appointment power to pack
the provincial judiciaries and the national Supreme Court with
staunch supporters of greater national powers. 9
C. Argentina
The Argentine Constitution follows the allocative formula of
the U.S. Constitution, specifically delegating a long list of pow-
ers to the federal government.' Article 121 tracks the language
of the U.S. Tenth Amendment, reserving to the provinces all
powers not delegated to the federal government, as well as all
powers expressly reserved in special pacts made at the time of
their incorporation into the federal system.41 Argentina's Con-
stitution, however, departs radically from the U.S. model by ex-
pressly granting the federal government broad general powers to
promote the economic prosperity of the nation and the conduct of
human development," as well as the power to enact civil, com-
mercial, penal, mining, and labor codes.43 Once the Argentine
Nature of Canadian Federalism, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 175, 179 (Frank R.
Scott ed., 1977).
38. Soberman, supra note 37, at 516.
39. See BRYAN SCHWARTZ, FATHOMING MEECH LAKE 93-94 (1987).
40. ARG. CONST. art. 75 (as amended 1994). This article contains 32 subsec-
tions, each setting out at least one, and sometimes several, powers of the federal
government.
41. An example of such a pact is that of San Josd de Flores of Nov. 11, 1859,
described in NESTOR P. SAG0tS, 1 ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 226
(1993).
42. ARG. CONST. art. 75(18) and (19) (as amended 1994). Prior to 1994, art.
67(16) authorized the federal government to legislate to promote the "prosperity of
the country, the movement and well-being of all the provinces . . ." The wording of
this clause was modified in the 1994 reform to grant the federal government the
power to legislate "to promote human development, economic progress with social
justice, the productivity of the national economy, the generation of jobs .... " Id. at
art. 75(19).
43. Id. at art. 75(12) (as amended 1994). The Federal Congress also has the
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Congress enacts these codes, the provinces can no longer regu-
late any matter covered by them." On the other hand, the Ar-
gentine provinces do have the power to enact codes of civil and
criminal procedure, which generally follow the codes for the fed-
eral capital.
D. Brazil
Brazil's 1988 Constitution partly follows the allocative for-
mula of the U.S. Constitution, but it delineates the distribution
of governmental powers in much greater detail and includes the
Federal District and the counties in the allocational scheme.45
Brazil also borrows from the German Basic Law in permitting
delegation of exclusive powers and in specifically providing for
concurrent powers.46 Article 21 of the Constitution specifically
delegates to the federal government a broad array of powers
that, even though not denominated "exclusive," are plainly
meant to be. These include the powers to maintain international
relations; to declare war and states of siege and to make peace;
to provide for defense; to regulate currency, exchange rates, and
mineral prospecting; and to operate or to regulate radio and
television broadcasting, the post office, and the federal police.47
Article 22 grants the federal government another broad array of
powers specifically labelled "exclusive," although some of these
powers overlap or repeat powers delegated in Article 21.'
Brazil's basic codes, including those on criminal and civil proce-
dure, are federal laws. Nonetheless, with respect to Article 22
powers, Congress may adopt complementary laws (requiring
approval by an absolute majority), authorizing the states to
specific power to promulgate labor and social security codes. Id.
44. Id. at art. 126.
45. For a detailed explanation of this formula, see FERNANDO DIAS MENEZES DE
ALMEIDA, COMPETENCiAS NA CONSTrTuiCAO DE 1988 (1991). The Federal District is
treated virtually as another state. It elects its own governor and legislature, and is
represented in the federal legislature under the same allocational formula as the
states.
46. GERMAN BASIC LAW, arts. 70-74.
47. BRAZ. CONST. art 21.
48. These include the powers to legislate on civil, commercial, penal, procedural,
electoral, agrarian, maritime, aeronautical, space and labor law; to regulate foreign
and interstate commerce, the postal service, foreign exchange, expropriation, mining,
informatics, national transportation policy, naturalization, social security, and com-
mercial advertising.
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legislate on specific matters in these areas of exclusive federal
competence.49
The Brazilian Constitution contains twelve areas where the
federal government, states, federal district, and counties
(municipios) have joint powers,' and sixteen areas where the
federal government, states, and the federal district have concur-
rent legislative authority.51 In the area of concurrent authority,
the federal government's power is limited to establishing general
rules.52 In the absence of federal legislation, the states may
freely regulate; however, where federal legislation exists, the
states may adopt only supplementary legislation. The residual
clause reserves to the states the powers not forbidden to them
by the Constitution.53 Counties are assured political, legislative,
administrative, and financial autonomy.' They also have the
power to legislate about subjects of local interest and to supple-
ment federal and state legislation.55
E. Venezuela
Venezuela's 1961 Constitution grants to the national govern-
ment a broad array of powers covering virtually all aspects of a
modern state, such as foreign affairs, defense, naturalization,
currency, taxation, armed forces, mineral resources, expropria-
tion, navigation, transportation, communications, banking, and
agrarian reform. 6 Like Brazil's, Venezuela's Constitution also
grants the national government the power to enact civil, com-
mercial, criminal, and procedural codes.57 In addition to a broad
specific grant of powers to the federal government, the Venezue-
lan Constitution also gives the federal government power over
"All other matters that this Constitution attributes to the Na-
tional Power or which corresponds to it by its type or nature."'
The counties (municipios) are granted the power to regulate
49. BRAz. CONST. art. 22 (I).
50. Id. at art. 23.
51. Id. at art. 24.
52. Id. at art. 24 (XVI) § 1.
53. Id. at art. 25 § 1Q.
54. Id. at arts. 18, 29, 30, 31, and 34(VII)c.
55. Id. at art. 30(I) & (II).
56. VENEZ. CONST. art. 136.
57. Id. at art. 136(240).
58. Id. at art. 136 (250).
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local concerns, such as urban growth, traffic, culture, health,
social assistance, and popular credit institutions. 9 On the other
hand, the states are granted virtually no significant powers
other than organizing their own governments. Although the
states have the residual powers,' the powers granted to the
federal government are so broad that little is left to the
states.61 To counterbalance this centralist tilt, the federal legis-
lature, by two-thirds vote, may grant powers to the states in the
interest of decentralization. 2
F. Mexico
Mexico's 1917 Constitution contains a broad grant of powers
to the federal government, including the power to legislate with
respect to hydrocarbons, mining, commerce, money, banking and
credit, communications, nuclear and electrical energy, foreign in-
vestment, technology, and labor. 3 Powers not expressly granted
to the federal government are reserved to the states.' Unlike
the other Latin American countries, Mexico permits the states to
enact their own basic codes, with the exception of commercial
and labor codes. Nonetheless, the states' civil, criminal, criminal
procedure, and civil procedure codes are virtually carbon copies
of the codes for the federal district.
G. The Vagaries of Allocative Formulas
There is little agreement as to how federal systems should
divide powers. The guiding principle - that the national govern-
ment should exercise powers dealing with national affairs, and
the states should exercise powers dealing with local affairs -
provides little guidance. Similarly unhelpful are modern refine-
ments, such as:
59. Id. at art. 30.
60. Id. at art. 17 (7).
61. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, LA CONsTITUcION Y Sus ENMiENDAS 28 (1991);
Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El Sistema Constitucional Venezolano, in LOS SISTEMAS
CONSTITUCIONALES IBEROAMERICANOS 771, 778 (Domingo Garcia Belaunde, Francisco
Ferndndez Segado & Rubdn Herndndez Valle eds., 1992) [hereinafter SISTEMAS
CONSTrrUCIONALES].
62. VENEZ. CONST. arts. 17, 137.
63. MEX_ CONST. art. 73.
64. Id. at art. 124.
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Policies and programs that affect the entire society more or
less equally are appropriately assigned to the central govern-
ment: national defense is the preeminent example. Policies
and programs that affect only one subdivision of society are
appropriately assigned to local governments .... 65
Other than assigning national defense to the federal govern-
ment, there is no uniformity in the constitutional formulas by
which federal systems of the Americas divide powers between
national and state governments. Even the treaty-making power
and the power to issue money, which functionally and logically
seem quintessential national powers, have not been assigned
solely to federal governments. Argentina grants the provinces,
with the consent of Congress, concurrent powers to enter into
partial treaties on various subjects.66 Treaties are not necessar-
ily the supreme law of the land in Canada; the treaty-making
power has been interpreted so narrowly that the federal govern-
ment cannot adopt legislation necessary to implement a treaty if
the substantive area of the treaty deals with matters constitu-
tionally allocated to provincial regulation.67
The U.S. Constitution is omissive in allocating power to
control issuance of currency. While it specifically prohibits the
states from issuing bills of credit (what paper money was then
called) and from making anything but gold or silver coin legal
tender, a provision authorizing the federal Congress to issue
bills of credit was stricken from the draft Constitution. Instead
Congress was given the power to coin money and to regulate its
value. Not until 1862, after great debate, did Congress issue
paper money in order to finance the Civil War. For a substantial
period in U.S. history, the circulating notes issued by state
banks constituted the bulk of the U.S. money supply.68 Not un-
til 1865 did Congress pre-empt control over monetary policy
from the states by the device of levying a 10 percent excise tax
65. PAUL E. PETERSON, BARRY G. RABE & KENNETH K. WONG, WHEN FEDERAL-
ISM WORKS 11 (1986).
66. ARG. CONST. art. 125 (as amended 1994).
67. A.G. Can. v. A.G. Ont. (Labour Conventions) [1937] A.C. 326; R. St. J.
Macdonald, International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of Canada, 2 DALHOUSIE
L. J. 307, 314-316 (1975). Moreover, Quebec has claimed the power to enter into its
own treaties. A. JACOMY-MILLETTE, TREATY LAW IN CANADA 78-91 (1975).
68. JAMES WILLARD HUIsT, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1774-1970, 142 (1973).
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on the amount of any state bank notes paid out after July 1,
1886.69
Nor are the textual formulas reliable indicators of how pow-
ers are actually divided. For example, the constitutions of these
six American Republics allocate the power to regulate criminal
and family law quite differently. The Constitutions of Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, and Venezuela confer the powers to regulate
criminal and family law on the federal government; in Mexico
and the U.S., these powers belong to the states under the resid-
ual clauses. These allocations, however, are not in practice mu-
tually exclusive divisions of power. The federal governments of
the U.S. and Mexico invade both these areas of state preserves.
Similarly, the Argentine and Canadian provinces and the Brazil-
ian states invade the federal domain of criminal law.
In the U.S., the federal government has enacted a large
number of federal criminal statutes. Initially, Congress
criminalized only activity that interfered with fairly obvious
federal interests, such as treason; piracy; counterfeiting; forging
government documents; murder, manslaughter, or maiming on
U.S. property; larceny on U.S. property or on the high seas;
perjury; bribery of a judge; robbing a mail carrier; and stealing
from the U.S. mail.7" During the twentieth century, however,
there has been a huge expansion of federal crimes with jurisdic-
tional hooks providing an ostensible linkage to the commerce or
taxing powers, such as crossing state lines, using an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, or possessing drugs or gambling
without paying a tax.'
Even though each Mexican state has its own criminal code,
these state codes are modeled upon the Penal Code for the Fed-
eral District. Moreover, the interpretation and application of
these state codes is federalized through the amparo jurisdiction
of the federal courts, which are the ultimate arbiters of the
meaning of state law. The Penal Code for the Federal District
69. Id. at 180. The constitutionality of this tax was sustained by the Supreme
Court in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
70. DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829, 7-10 (1985).
71. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 165-166 (4th ed. 1991); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited- The
Federalization of Interstate Crime, 15 ARmZ. L. REV. 271 (1973).
72. See notes 110-112 infra and accompanying text.
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contains certain provisions involving crimes against the nation
that apply nationally rather than just to the Federal District.
The determination of whether a provision applies nationally or
only in the federal district is left open to "constitutional judg-
ment."'3 In addition, the federal government has enacted nu-
merous criminal statutes that apply nationally.74 Attempts by
Mexican states to challenge such federal criminal legislation as
invading their sovereign powers have been unsuccessful.75
Argentina and Brazil have federal criminal codes that apply
throughout the nation. Nevertheless, the great bulk of the feder-
al crimes are prosecuted by state prosecutors in the state
courts.76 Canada also has a federal criminal code that applies to
the entire nation, but all federal offenses are prosecuted in the
provincial courts by federal prosecutors.77 The Canadian Su-
preme Court has occasionally invalidated federal criminal legis-
lation on the dubious ground that the federal statute invaded
powers reserved to the states.78 The federal government's mo-
nopoly on the criminal law is incomplete because the provinces
are permitted to enforce provincial laws by imposing fines and
prison terms.79 While provincial penal legislation was initially
73. HELEN L. CLAGErr & DAVID M. VALDERRAMA, A REVISED GuIDE TO THE
LAW & LEGAL LrPERATuRE OF MEXICO 178 (1973).
74. These statutes are collected in FILBERTO CARDENAS V., LEGISLACI6N PENAL
Y JURISPRUDENCIA 1917-1991 (1992).
75. See Jost A. G. QUINTANILLA, DERECHO PENAL MEXICANO 162 (1991).
76. In Argentina, crimes are tried in federal courts only when the federal gov-
ernment has a particular stake in the matter, such as embezzlement of federal
funds or the crime is committed on federal territory. Otherwise crimes are
prosecuted in the state courts. ALEJANDRO D. CARRI6, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTI-
NA 21 (1989). The same kind of division of jurisdiction occurs in Brazil. Weber Mar-
tins Batista, An Overview of Brazdian Criminal Procedure, in A PANORAMA OF BRA-
ZILIAN LAW 207, 208 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith S. Rosenn eds., 1992).
77. Federal crimes are prosecuted by Crown Attorneys, who are agents of the
federal Attorney General, but trials and appeals are conducted within the provincial
courts. A final appeal to the federal Supreme Court is possible in certain cases.
KENNETH L. CLARKE, RICHARD BARNHORST & SHERRIE BARNHORST, CRIMINAL LAW
AND THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE 10-18 (1977)[hereinafter CANADIAN CRIMINAL
LAW].
78. E.g., Re The Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and The Combines and Fair
Prices Act, [19221 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.); Reference Re Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry
Act, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 (S.C.C.); afld [1951] A.C. 179 (P.C.); Dominion Stores Ltd.
v. The Queen, [1979] 50 C.C.C. (2d) 277 (S.C.C.); Labatt Breweries of Can. Ltd. v.
A.G. Can, [1979] 52 C.C.C. (2d) 433 (S.C.C.).
79. Prison sentences can be substantial. For example, an Ontario law provides
for imprisonment of "two years less a day." CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 77,
at 12.
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curtailed by exercise (or threat) of the federal power of disallow-
ance, in modern times provincial criminal legislation has pro-
liferated, often overlapping with federal legislation. The modern
tendency of the Canadian courts is to permit concurrent jurisdic-
tion in the criminal law area.' ° Moreover, the province of Que-
bec, through interpretation and translation, has managed to
place its own distinctive gloss on the federal criminal code.8'
Family law does not escape federal interference in either the
U.S. or Mexico. For example, in 1980, the U.S. Congress enacted
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to try to deter inter-
state abductions and inconsistent state court awards of child
custody. 2 An important source of child support in the U.S. is a
cooperative federal-state program called Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, funded largely by the federal government
and administered by the states. In 1971, after several Mexican
states' "divorce mills" had become an international embarrass-
ment, the federal government of Mexico effectively prohibited
the Mexican states from divorcing non-resident aliens."M In ad-
dition, federal labor law, health law, social security, and social
assistance all regulate diverse aspects of family law in Mexi-
co. 
84
The nature of federal-state relations has changed signifi-
cantly from the 18th and 19th centuries, when jurists operated
with the dual federalist theory that constitutional grants of
power were mutually exclusive. Regardless of the constitutional
allocation, crime and family law, like most subject matters allo-
cated by federal constitutions, are matters of both national and
local concern. Consequently, any formula that allocates subjects
like these to either the federal government or to state govern-
80. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, A CENTURY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN LAW 54-57 (1984).
81. Nicholas Kasirer, The Annotated Criminal Code en version qudb6coise: Signs
of Territoriality in Canadian Criminal Law, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 520 (1990).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
83. This was accomplished by amending the Law on Nationality and National-
ization to prohibit the state court from granting any divorce involving foreigners
without a certificate issued by the Secretariat of the Federal Government showing
legal residence in Mexico, and to prohibit jurisdiction in such cases from being based
upon voluntary submission to Mexican courts. Decree of Feb. 3, 1971, published in
the Diario Oficial of Feb. 20, 1971.
84. Manuel F. ChAvez Asencio, La Familia en la Legislaci6n Mexicana, 23
JURiDICA (UNIV. IBEROAMERICANA) 381, 394-408 (1994).
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ments, will in practice become an allocation of concurrent pow-
ers. Today the more appropriate metaphor for constitutional
allocations of most powers is not a layer cake but a marble
cake.'
III. JUDICIAL UMPIRING OF THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM
Constitutions often fail to address crucial issues of federal-
ism. When disputes arise, who decides how the balance of power
should be allocated is critical. Granting the power to decide to
the president or national congress tilts the balance in favor of
the federal government. Leaving the decision to state governors
or legislatures produces the opposite tilt. As the least political
branch, the courts provide the most logical forum for developing
appropriate principles to decide these disputes objectively.'
One of the most notable differences between the Anglo-
American and Latin American nations is that the former inherit-
ed the common law tradition, while the latter inherited the civil
law tradition.s7 In the civil law tradition, the bulk of private
law is set out in basic codes. With the exception of Mexico, the
power to enact the basic codes in the Latin American countries
lies with the federal government rather than with the states or
provinces. Moreover, the civil law judge has far less power than
his common law counterpart, who has traditionally invented
much of the law in the process of finding it. Both
constitutionalism and the courts have traditionally been much
weaker in Latin America." As a result, its judiciary has usu-
ally not served as the ultimate arbiter of the balance of power
between the states and the national government. That role has
85. Morton Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization in the American Feder-
al System, in A NATION OF STATES 1 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1963).
86. This too produces a problem, for federal systems usually have dual court
structures. Placing the decision with the federal courts tends to increase federal
power at the expense of state and local power, while giving the decision to the state
courts tends to produce an increase in state power.
87. See Keith S. Rosenn, A Comparison of Latin American and North American
Legal Traditions, in MULTINATIONAL MANAGERS AND HOST GOVERNMENT INTERAC-
TIONS 127-152 (Lee Tavis ed., 1988). The statement in the text requires minor qual-
ification for Quebec, Louisiana, and Puerto Rico, which are mixed civil and common
law jurisdictions.
88. Rosenn, supra note 3, at 27; Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial
Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 23-35 (1987).
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normally been assumed by the executive or the legislature. In
Canada and the U.S., however, the ultimate arbiter of the bal-
ance of power between federal and state interests has usually
been the federal Supreme Court. 9
A. The Need for Judicial Review
One of the most celebrated Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, observed:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
that the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States.'
Holmes recognized that every federal system must have some
mechanism to allow the supremacy of the federal constitution
and laws to prevail over inconsistent provisions of state constitu-
tions and laws; otherwise, it will splinter. The successful consti-
tutional experience of Switzerland, where the Federal Tribunal
(Bundesgericht) has the power to declare cantonial (state) legis-
lation unconstitutional, but cannot invalidate acts of the Federal
Assembly, provides substantial support for the truth of Holmes'
observation."
The American federalist systems adhere to the principle of
the supremacy of the federal constitution and federal law over
conflicting state norms. The U.S. Constitution curiously express-
es the Supremacy Clause as a command to state judges:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Con-
89. Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Su-
premacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United
States, 1990 DUKE L. J. 1229, 1259.
90. "Law and the Court," speech at the Harvard Law Association, New York,
Feb. 15, 1913, reprinted in THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HoLMES 387, 390 (Max
Lerner ed., 1943).
91. Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM.
J. COMP. L. 205, 254 (1990).
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stitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.9
U.S. courts regularly invalidate state legislation not only for
conflicts with the Constitution, but also for explicit or implicit
conflicts with federal legislation."
Argentina and Mexico have constitutional provisions directly
modeled on the U.S. Supremacy Clause.94 Brazil has a similar
provision.95 Venezuela achieves the same result by denying to
the states the power to do anything that does not conform to the
Constitution and requiring that all exercise of public power
conform to the Constitution.96 The Canadian Constitution Act
of 1982 explicitly states that the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land and that any inconsistent statute is without
effect. 7  All these countries have developed complex systems
of judicial review. Even though nothing in the constitutions of
the U.S. or Canada explicitly authorizes the federal courts to
declare statutes unconstitutional, both countries have developed
decentralized systems of judicial review in which all levels of the
federal and state judiciaries routinely determine the constitu-
tionality of both federal and state legislation. From 1887 to
1994, the Argentine Supreme Court, also without explicit consti-
tutional authorization, developed a decentralized system of judi-
cial review in which all levels of both the federal and state judi-
ciaries routinely determine the constitutionality of both federal
and provincial legislation.9" Argentina's 1994 constitutional re-
form now explicitly authorizes judicial review.' Brazil has a
decentralized system of judicial review, but it is based on specif-
ic constitutional authorization that originated in the 1891 Con-
92. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
93. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, JOHN E. NOWAK & J. NELSON YOUNG, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 12.1-12.7 (1986).
94. ARG. CONST. art. 31; MEX. CONsT. art. 41.
95. BRAZ. CONST. art. 24 § 4Q.
96. VENEZ. CoNsT. arts. 17(70) and 177.
97. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), art. 52(1).
98. Argentina has much stronger historical evidence than does the U.S. that
the authors of its Constitution intended that the courts exercise the power of judicial
review. SANTOS P. AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (1943).
99. Article 116, a new provision inserted into the Argentine Constitution by the
partial reform of Law 24.309 of 1994, specifically authorizes all Argentine courts to
hear all cases involving constitutional issues.
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stitution,' ° which first adopted federalism. The 1988 Brazilian
Constitution contains an extraordinarily elaborate set of proce-
dures for judicial review, including an abstract action of uncon-
stitutionality that must be brought directly before the Supreme
Court. 1 ' The Mexican Constitution confers the power of judi-
cial review only upon the federal courts. 102 The Venezuelan
Constitution confers the power of judicial review only upon the
Supreme Court,"0 3 but Article 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure
permits all federal courts to declare state acts unconstitution-
al. 1
04
Prior to 1982, judicial review in Canada did not involve
claims of violations of the rights of individuals. In 1982, howev-
er, Canada adopted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
set out for the first time a constitutional list of rights and free-
doms. Article 24(1) of this Charter grants anyone whose rights
have been infringed the right to seek judicial relief from a court
of competent jurisdiction. Since then, the Canadian courts have
exercised the power of judicial review to protect individual
rights. Curiously, the Canadian Supreme Court does not have
the final word in invalidating either federal or provincial stat-
utes for violation of most of the rights protected in the Charter.
Maintaining the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy,
Article 33 of the Charter permits the federal or provincial legis-
latures expressly to override certain fundamental rights protect-
ed by the Charter for a five-year period, renewable for another
five years.
B. Which Courts Are the Final Arbiters of State Law?
The federal supreme courts of the American republics have
developed quite different approaches to determining the mean-
ing of state or provincial law. In some countries the ultimate
power to interpret state or provincial law lies with the highest
federal court. In others, the ultimate power lies with the highest
100. BRAZ. CONST. art. 59 (II) § 1Q (1891).
101. Keith S. Rosenn, A Comparison of the Protection of Individual Rights in the
New Constitutions of Colombia and Brazil, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 659, 680-
688 (1992).
102. MFx CONST. arts. 103(I) and 107(VIII).
103. VENEZ. CONST. art. 215.
104. ALLAN BREWER-CARiAS, JUDICIAL REVIEw IN COMPARATIVE LAw 276 (1989).
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state or provincial court.
1. United States
In the U.S., federal courts often apply state law, particularly
in cases of diversity jurisdiction. In 1842, in the case of Swift v.
Tyson,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal courts
should decide diversity cases by fashioning a federal common
law unless the case were governed by a state constitutional or
statutory provision, or particular local interest. Swift v. Tyson
was primarily motivated by the Supreme Court's desire to create
a federal common law that would facilitate commercial transac-
tions. The Supreme Court had hoped that the states would fol-
low the decisions of the federal courts, and that the creation of a
uniform set of legal rules for commercial transactions would
encourage the development of a national economy. This was not
what happened. While the federal courts developed an elaborate
body of federal common law for torts, contracts, and commercial
transactions, the state courts continued to follow their own com-
mon law precedents. The resulting diversity simply aggravated
the legal uncertainties of U.S. federalism. Which set of rules
governed a transaction depended upon the vagaries of the citi-
zenship of the parties. Finally, in the celebrated decision of Erie
v. Tompkins,"°6 the Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson,
holding that the lower federal courts should abandon the at-
tempt to create a federal common law in diversity cases; instead
they should apply state law just as if they were courts of the
state in which they are sitting.
The state supreme courts, rather than the U.S. Supreme
Court, are the final arbiters of the meaning of state law. Even
though the Constitution does not so require, the U.S. Supreme
Court has long taken the position that the state courts make the
ultimate decisions about the meaning of their own constitutions
and laws, and their interpretations are binding upon the federal
courts."' The U.S. Supreme Court also has long taken the po-
sition that it cannot even review a decision of a state court that
105. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
106. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
107. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
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arguably violates the U.S. Constitution, a treaty, or federal law
if the decision also rests upon an independent and adequate
state ground. If, however, it is unclear or ambiguous whether
the state court's opinion rests upon state or federal grounds, the
Supreme Court will assume that the state court decided the case
upon federal rather than state grounds.1..
2. Canada
The Canadian courts differ significantly in their approach to
this issue. The provincial courts are the primary courts in Cana-
da. When reviewing their decisions, however, the Supreme Court
of Canada is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of both the
common law and provincial statutes."° Although the Canadian
Constitution grants the provinces a larger exclusive law-making
sphere than does the U.S. Constitution, Canada's federal courts
exercise considerably more centralized control over provincial
lawmaking than do the federal courts in the U.S.
3. Mexico
In Mexico, federal judicial control over state court decisions
and state law is even more centralized. A clause in Article 14 of
the Mexican Constitution provides: "In civil cases the final judg-
ment shall be according to the letter of the law or the juridical
interpretation of the law; in the absence of the latter, it shall be
based upon general principles of law.11 Read literally, this
clause would appear to establish a constitutional right to have
all decisions made correctly, and that is precisely the interpreta-
tion that the Mexican Supreme Court has given to it. Conse-
quently, the Mexican federal courts routinely review state court
decisions in which the only federal question is whether the state
court correctly interpreted or applied state law. Article 14 has
become a way of appealing, by way of direct amparo,"' from
108. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
109. Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United
States, 55 L. & CONT. PROB. 107, 113 (1992).
110. MEX. CONST. art. 14, cl. 4.
111. Amparo is a summary procedure for judicial protection of constitutional
rights. See generally RICHARD BAKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A STUDY OF THE
AMPARO SUIT (1971); IGNACIO BURGOA, EL Juicio DE AMPARO (28th ed. 1991);
[Vol. 26:1
1994] COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM
the state courts to the federal courts in virtually every case. This
kind of amparo is called the amparo de la legalidad or the
amparo-casaci6n. The Supreme Court leaves the interpretation
of the facts to the state courts, but every question of the mean-
ing of state law can be converted into a federal constitutional
question. This has resulted in a deluge of cases filed in the fed-
eral courts of appeals from state court decisions, involving really
only state law issues."' This system hardly seems compatible
with a real federalist judicial system.
4. Brazil
In Brazil, the final arbiter of the meaning of state law can
be either a state or federal tribunal, depending upon the parties
or type of case. Both state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over claims based upon either federal or state law.
The basic codes are federal, but whether litigants bring a case in
HkCToR Fix ZAMUDIO, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO (1964).
112. The Mexican Supreme Court has long struggled with a huge backlog, which
exceeded 12,000 cases by 1923. In 1928, the number of judges was increased from
11 to 16 and the Court was divided into three chambers. The number of judges was
increased to 21 and a fourth Chamber was added in 1934. In 1951, Collegiate Cir-
cuit Courts were created, and part of the of Court's backlog was transferred to them
in nonappealable form. By 1967, when the backlog exceeded 20,000 cases, for the
first time the Supreme Court, albeit only the Second Chamber (Administrative), was
granted discretion to hear only those cases of national interest. KENNETH L. KARST
& KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 130-132 (1975). In
1986, this discretionary power to refuse to hear appeals that lacked transcendent
social importance was extended to the Penal, Civil, and Labor Chambers, as well as
the Court sitting en banc. A constitutional amendment that took effect in January
1988 converted the Mexican Supreme Court essentially into a constitutional court;
unless the case law is in conflict, appeals involving only issues of legality are left
with the Circuit Courts. Jorge Carpizo & Jorge Madrazo, El Sisterna Constitucional
Mexicano, in SISTEMAS CONSTITUCIONALES, supra note 61, at 594-95. On December
31, 1994, President Zedillo promulgated a constitutional amendment that removed
the entire Supreme Court, reduced the size of the Court from 26 to 11, and fixed
the term of service at 15 years. This amendment also modifies Article 105 of the
Constitution in two important ways. One, it makes decisions of the Mexican Su-
preme Court effective erga omnes when they declare federal, state or municipal laws
unconstitutional for invading the powers reserved to another federative entity, pro-
vided the decision is approved by at least eight of the eleven ministers. Two, it
permits abstract review of legislation by the Supreme Court within thirty days of a
law's promulgation, but standing to challenge the law is limited to the federal
Procurator General or one-third of the members of a legislative body enacting the
law. At least eight votes are required to invalidate a law in the abstract. Joseph J.
Aragones, "Reshaping the Mexican Judiciary," 2 INTER-AM. TRADE & INVEST. L., No.
21, Apr. 7, 1995, at 280, and No. 22, Apr. 14, 1995, at 284.
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state or federal courts usually does not depend upon the law
involved. Rather, it depends upon whether the federal govern-
ment has an interest in the litigation, and whether there is a
federal judge in the judicial district. If the federal government or
one of its agencies has an interest in the outcome, the case is
normally brought in the federal courts. But if no federal judge
exists in the district, such cases will be tried before a state
judge,"3 and an appeal can then be taken to the appropriate
Federal Regional Tribunal. Other cases are normally brought in
the state courts, and an appeal can be taken to the State Tribu-
nal of Justice or Tribunal of Algada, depending upon the subject
matter or amount involved. If the decision contravenes a treaty
or federal law, upholds a state or municipal law challenged as
contrary to federal law, or interprets federal law differently from
some other tribunal, the decision can be reviewed on special
appeal by the recently created Superior Tribunal of Justice. If
the decision conflicts with a provision of the federal Constitu-
tion, declares a treaty or federal law unconstitutional, or up-
holds the constitutionality of a state or local act, an extraordi-
nary appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal may be taken."
5. Argentina
In Argentina, the procedure for federal review of provincial
court decisions resembles that of the U.S."' In 1863, Argentina
enacted a procedural law adopting the writ of error from the
U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789. Decisions of provincial courts involv-
ing issues of federal or provincial law normally terminate in the
provincial courts. Final decisions of the superior provincial
courts may be appealed to the Argentine Supreme Court only
where: (1) the validity of a treaty, federal statute, or authority
exercised in the name of the nation has been drawn in question,
and the decision is against its validity; (2) the validity of a law,
decree or authority of a province has been drawn in question as
repugnant to the Constitution, a treaty, or a federal statute, and
the decision is in favor of its validity; or (3) the meaning of some
113. BRAZ. CONST. art. 109.
114. Id. at arts. 102-108.
115. See GERMAN J. BIDART CAMPoS, 2 TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO
CONSTrrUcIONAL ARGENTINO 351-353 (1989); NESTOR P. SAGOtS, 1 RECURSO
EXTRAORDINARIO 199-255 (1984).
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clause of the Constitution, a treaty, a federal statute or a com-
mission exercised in the name of the national government has
been drawn in question, and its validity denied, provided that a
right, title, privilege or exemption based upon such clause is
material to the litigation.' The Argentine Supreme Court will
not review decisions of the provincial courts interpreting provin-
cial constitutions and statutes so long as they do not conflict
with the federal constitution or statutes." ' Nor will it review
judgments of provincial courts allegedly misapplying or misinter-
preting general codes enacted by the national Congress.1 ' Ar-
gentina has also adopted from the U.S. a variant on the ade-
quate state ground rule. If the federal question is not indepen-
dent of provincial law or general code provisions (i.e., the federal
civil, commercial, criminal, mining and labor codes), the Su-
preme Court will decline to review the decision below." 9
6. Venezuela
This problem does not arise in Venezuela, which has only a
federal court system. Venezuela abolished the state courts in
1945.120
C. Economic Regulation
One of the thorniest problems of federalism in the U.S. and
Canada has been division of the powers of economic regulation.
These powers go to the heart of federalism and are critical to the
ability to establish and to maintain a common market.
1. United States
The U.S. Supreme Court determined early on that the enu-
merated powers granted to the federal government also included
116. Law 48 of Sept. 14, 1863, art 14.
117. Sociedad An6nima Frigorifico Anglo v. Fisco de la Provincia de Buenos Ai-
res, 172 Fallos 149 (1934).
118. AMADEO, supra note 98, at 74; LINO E. PALACIO, EL RECURSO
ExTRAoRDNARiO FEDERAL: TEORiA Y TkCNICA 148-51 (1992).
119. 0. Bemberg y Companiia v. Julio A- Rocha, 133 Fallos 298, 303-304 (1921).
120. Allan R. Brewer-Carias, El Sistema Constitucional Venezolano, in SISEMAS
CoNsTrFUcIoNALES, supra note 61, at 771, 796.
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powers that could reasonably be implied therefrom and permit-
ted broad discretion in the choice of means to implement these
powers.' 2' Nevertheless, between 1895 and 1937, the Supreme
Court narrowly confined the scope of federal powers to deal with
national economic problems. By 1937, this crabbed construction
of federal powers resulted in the invalidation of a significant
number of federal statutes deemed essential to the Roosevelt
Administration's attempts to produce an economic recovery from
the Great Depression. President Roosevelt responded by an-
nouncing his controversial "court packing plan," which would
have increased the number of justices from 9 to 15. The plan
was defeated, partly because the Court formed a new majority
that began to uphold federal economic measures that would
have previously been declared unconstitutional, and partly be-
cause many in the country decried the threat to judicial indepen-
dence. During the next four years, President Roosevelt had the
opportunity to nominate seven new justices, creating a majority
that was favorable to his New Deal program. This new majority
overturned the cases that narrowly construed the federal
government's powers to regulate the economy and broadened
those powers extensively.'22 Between 1937 and 1995, the Su-
preme Court interpreted the interstate commerce clause broadly
to permit the Congress to regulate any economic activity or
proscribe any criminal activity that Congress wished.' So-
phisticated commentators observed that the real constraints
upon Congress' commerce power were political rather than judi-
cial.12 4
Nevertheless, in April 1995, for the first time in nearly 60
years, the Supreme Court held that the commerce power was
not broad enough to sustain a federal statute. By a 5-4 vote, the
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
121. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (implying the power
of the federal government to create a bank from the powers to lay and collect taxes,
to borrow money, to regulate commerce, raise armies, and to conduct war).
122. The story of this revolution is told authoritatively in Robert L. Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1946).
123. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421 (1987).
124. See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); Francis G. Jacobs & Kenneth L. Karst, The "Federal" Legal Order: The
US.A. and Europe Compared, A Juridical Perspective, in INTEGRATION THROUGH
LAW, supra note 4, at 169, 200-201.
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which made it a federal offense for anyone to possess a firearm
in a school zone. The statute contained no requirement that the
possession in any way be connected with interstate commerce,
nor did it contain any legislative findings indicating how pos-
session of a firearm in a school zone affected interstate com-
merce. Acknowledging that prior case law was unclear as to
whether an intrastate activity must simply "affect" or "substan-
tially affect" interstate commerce in order for Congress to be
able to regulate it, the majority held that the regulated activity
must substantially affect interstate commerce and possession of
guns in schools had no such effect.'" The dissent, relying on
facts in reports and published literature, took the position that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that guns in school
zones had a deleterious commercial effect on primary and sec-
ondary schools, which spent $230 billion in 1990. Whether this
decision will seriously curtail Congressional ability to regulate
crimes and other activity that is not obviously economic, or is
merely a warning to Congress to make specific findings of how
an activity actually affects commerce, is unclear.
In United States v. Robertson,"6 a case decided the follow-
ing week, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that it did not
have to decide the question that it had granted certiorari to
decide: Whether the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) can be constitutionally applied to a
local business (an Alaskan gold mine) that does not serve the
interstate market and has only an incidental effect on interstate
commerce. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had overturned
the racketeering conviction of a former federal prosecutor, who
opened the mine with money from narcotics dealing, on the
ground that there was no evidence to show that activities of the
mine or its proceeds affected interstate commerce. Instead, the
Court recharacterized the facts and found the mine was directly,
rather than incidentally, engaged in interstate commerce be-
cause it had hired seven out-of-state employees and had pur-
chased supplies from another state.'27
125. United States v. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343, 4346 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995). The
dissenters contended that the Constitution requires that the regulated activity have
only a "significant effect" on interstate commerce. Id. at 4362.
126. __ S.Ct. __, 63 U.S.L.W. 4386, 1995 WL 247479 (U.S.).
127. No. 94-251, see Linda Greenhouse, "Justices Decline to Expand Commerce.
Clause Ruling," NY TIMES (National), May 2, 1995, at A12.
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The Supreme Court has permitted the federal government
to purchase state compliance with federal guidelines by uphold-
ing a broad array of conditions attached to federal funding. In
South Dakota v. Dole,12 the Court upheld a federal statute
that secured a national minimum drinking age by withholding 5
per cent of all federal highway funds from states that failed to
prohibit people under the age of 21 from drinking alcohol. While
dicta indicated that such a conditional spending measure might
be invalid under any of four circumstances,'29 since 1936 the
Supreme Court has not invalidated any federal spending mea-
sures on federalism grounds, despite conditions routinely at-
tached to federal grants that intrude substantially into state
autonomy. 3'
The U.S. Supreme Court regularly invalidates state laws for
violation of the so-called "dormant" interstate commerce clause.
The Supreme Court interprets the interstate commerce clause to
prohibit state legislation that discriminates against interstate
commerce, even when Congress has not exercised its commerce
clause power. It also invalidates certain non-discriminatory state
legislation. In 1851, the Court established the so-called "Cooley
Rule," which permits states to regulate matters of commerce
only if the nature of the subject matter does not require a uni-
form national rule.'3 ' Since 1945, the Court has usually en-
gaged in a more sophisticated balancing test in which it weighs
the burdens on interstate commerce against the purported bene-
fits of the state statute. Given the substantial inertia of Con-
gress, the U.S. Supreme Court has seen its role as the protector
of free trade and a common market, and has been particularly
vigilant in combatting state protectionism. 32 In the area of the
128. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
129. These circumstances are: (1) if the conditional spending measure is not for
the general welfare, (2) if the condition is ambiguous, (3) if the condition is unre-
lated to the federal interest in the particular program, or (4) if the condition coerces
the states.
130. Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1162 (1987).
131. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, .53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
132. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). See also
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Con-
stitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, contending that the values of
Federalism would be better served if the courts left oversight of the commerce
clause solely to Congress.
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dormant commerce clause, however, the U.S. Supreme Court is
not the ultimate umpire of the federal system. Congress may
consent to state legislation that would otherwise violate the dor-
mant Commerce Clause133 or override the Court's decisions by
validating unconstitutional state statutes.
3 4
Some members of the U.S. Supreme Court have been
searching for a way to impose limits upon exercise of the federal
commerce power to invade what they deem essential functions of
the state governments. Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court uni-
formly upheld application of federal regulatory statutes to state
activities. In National League of Cities v. Usery,"'3 however, the
Supreme Court reversed a 1968 precedent" and held that fed-
eral minimum wage requirements could not be applied to state
employees performing traditional state functions. It is not clear
whether Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion was based upon
the Tenth Amendment or a concept of state sovereignty inherent
in the structure of the Constitution, but the decision established
the principle that the federal government could not use its com-
merce power "to directly displace the State's freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions."'37 Nine years later, the Supreme Court reversed
this decision, announcing in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,' that the distinction made in National
League of Cities between traditional state functions and nontra-
ditional state functions was unworkable. 9 Instead of replacing
this distinction with a new test, the Court abandoned the task of
protecting state sovereignty from the federal government. Jus-
tice Blackmun's opinion announced that "the principal means
chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself." Each state has two Senators and the President is chosen
133. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
134. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State
Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1983).
135. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
136. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding application of federal
minimum wage and maximum hours legislation to most state and local government
employees).
137. Id. at 852.
138. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
139. See generally Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985).
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by the states through the electoral college. The states have indi-
rect influence over the election of their representatives, and
therefore, the political processes should be the real check on
overreaching by the federal government, not the courts.
In 1992, the Supreme Court once again returned to this
problem. In New York v. United States,"4 ° the Supreme Court
invalidated a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985,"4 a statute that ironically
was an exercise in cooperative federalism. The states had been
bickering for years about the unfairness of some states sending
their nuclear wastes to others for disposal. Had Congress direct-
ly regulated the area, such a statute would have been plainly
constitutional. Instead, Congress tried to confine the federal role
to policing a solution agreed to by the states themselves. The
federal statute made each state, either by itself or in co-opera-
tion with other states, responsible for providing for disposal of
low-level nuclear wastes generated within the state. The federal
government enforced the state-created disposal plans by setting
deadlines for their implementation, offering monetary incentives
for compliance and imposing surcharges for non-compliance. If
by January 1, 1996, a state still had not provided its own dispos-
al site or entered into a compact with other states to dispose of
its wastes, the statute forced the non-complying state to take
title to the radioactive wastes generated within its borders. The
Supreme Court declared only the "take title""42 provision of the
statute unconstitutional. The financial incentive provisions were
deemed constitutional because the states had genuine choices
whether to comply or not. The take title requirement, however,
was deemed unconstitutional because "Congress lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit" activity that
Congress itself could have required or prohibited directly. It is
doubtful that this attempt to impose a non-textual federalist
limitation upon the exercise of federal power will prove any
more viable than the prior attempts.
The latest chapter has just been written by the U.S. Con-
gress, whose new Republican majority pushed through legisla-
tion severely limiting the ability of the federal government to
140. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)-(o) (1994).
142. 112 S. Ct. at 2428-2429.
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enact legislation that imposes unfunded regulatory costs upon
the states. The new legislation requires Congress to study the
costs of new regulations and to find ways to pay for these costs;
however, Congress can specifically waive the reimbursement
requirement by separate vote.' This measure should sharply
reduce some of the complaints of state and local governments
about the impact of federal regulations.
2. Canada
In Canada, the role of the British Privy Council and its
successor, the Canadian Supreme Court, has been much the
opposite of the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the broad grant of
power to the federal government to regulate trade and commerce
in the Constitution Act of 1867 indicated that the national gov-
ernment ought to play the dominant role in economic regulation,
the courts limited the role of Canada's national government to
enacting economic regulation that was either international or
interprovincial. By the end of the 19th century, the Privy Coun-
cil had construed the broad residual powers granted by Section
91 of the 1867 Constitution Act narrowly, limiting the federal
government's residual powers to matters of national concern."
In 1916, the Privy Council overturned the Federal Insurance
Act of 1910, which provided for federal licensing of all insurers
except those engaged only in intra-provincial insurance, holding
that the federal parliament lacked any residual power to regu-
late the insurance business. 45 In 1925, the Privy Council
struck down federal labor legislation on the grounds that labor
relations were matters of "property or civil rights," assigned
exclusively to the provinces. The federal government's residual
power could not be used to justify labor legislation unless there
was some extraordinary peril to the national life of Canada as a
143. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that between 1983 and 1990,
federal regulations forced state and local governments to assume between 8.9 to 12.7
billion dollars in unreimbursed costs. John H. Cushman Jr., "Congress Limits Federal
Orders Costly to States," N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at 1.
144. Attorney-General for Ont. v. Attorney-General for Can. [1896] 11 APP. CAS.
222 (The Local Prohibition Case).
145. Attorney-General for Can. v. Attorney-General of Alta. and B.C., [1916] 26
D.L.R. 288.
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whole.'46
In contradistinction to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Privy
Council invalidated much of the Canadian federal legislation
designed to deal with the Great Depression. The Council invali-
dated minimum wage and maximum hour laws as an attempt to
regulate labor relations, an area deemed reserved to the provinc-
es.147 The Privy Council invalidated unemployment insurance
on the theory that it invaded the powers exclusively granted to
the provinces under the Property and Civil Rights Clause."
The Council reached this result by generously construing the
provinces' power to legislate with respect to "property and civil
rights," a power that was originally intended simply to protect
Quebec's civil law system. Indeed, the Canadian courts have con-
strued the Property and Civil Rights Clause to permit the prov-
inces to regulate virtually all labor law, consumer product stan-
dards, securities, insurance, and much financial activity. 49
Consequently, Canada has been less successful than the U.S. in
creating an internal common market. "Provincial legislation
favoring local business interests and discriminating against
goods produced in other provinces has begun seriously to
'balkanize' the Canadian economy. "xs
The federal government of Canada has also utilized its
spending power to augment its powers by conditioning grants to
the provinces on their enactment of appropriate legislation, but
this practice has been much more problematic in Canada than in
the U.S. Quebec has refused to participate in certain social pro-
grams that were funded by conditional grants from the federal
government. Instead, Quebec has directed its own social pro-
grams and has obtained unconditional grants of funds from the
federal government. Provincial resentment against conditional
federal spending led to a 1987 constitutional amendment limit-
146. Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5.
147. Attorney-General for Can. v. Attorney-General for Ont. (Labor Conventions),
[19371 1 D.L.R. 673.
148. Attorney-General for Can. v. Attorney-General for Ont. (unemployment in-
surance), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684. This decision was reversed by a 1940 constitutional
amendment, which granted the federal government the power to deal with unemploy-
ment insurance. Constitution Act of 1867, § 91, cl. 2A.
149. Katherine Swinton, Federalism under Fire: The Role of the Supreme Court
of Canada, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 123 (1992).
150. Donald P. Kommers, Federalism and European Integration: A Commentary,
in INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw, supra note 4, at 603, 605.
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ing the spending power of the federal government whenever this
power establishes a national cost-sharing program in an area
where the provinces have exclusive jurisdiction. Such funding
programs must allow any province to opt out and to receive
unconditional funding from the federal government "if the prov-
ince carries a program or initiative that is compatible with the
national objectives.""'
Ironically, the process of judicial interpretation has resulted
in the evolution of Canadian federalism in a manner that resem-
bles the division of powers originally designed for the U.S., while
U.S. federalism has evolved in a manner that resembles the
division of powers originally intended for Canada. The intent of
the drafters of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 was to
create a quasi-unitary state controlled by a national parliament,
but judicial interpretation has given the provinces a much stron-
ger role in governance of the country. In the U.S., the constitu-
tional plan contemplated a much more limited role for national
government and a more dominant role for the state govern-
ments, but judicial interpretation has permitted an enormous
growth in the powers of the national government.
3. Latin America
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela have not had
similar court battles about federalist constraints upon the pow-
ers of the federal government to regulate the economy.'52 This
is partly because they are civil law countries whose legal sys-
tems are predicated upon basic codes, and the constitutions of
all these countries have conferred the power to enact the com-
mercial codes upon the federal government. It is also partly be-
cause frequent periods of political instability have led to domina-
tion of the states and provinces by the central government
through military intervention and frequent changes in constitu-
tional texts.
151. Constitution Amendment, § 106A (1987). See Lenaerts, supra note 91, at
246.
152. Argentina has had a number of cases involving the power of the states to
tax instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See AMADFO, supra note 98, at 119-25.
It has not, however, had the fierce battles concerning the extent of federal power to
enact economic legislation that have occurred in the U.S. or Canada.
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The more serious federalist concern in the economic area
has been the enormous growth in the power of the central gov-
ernments over the states and provinces through the federal tax-
ing and spending powers." In each of these four Latin Ameri-
can countries, the states or provinces are far more heavily de-
pendent upon federal subsidies, which inevitably come with
federal controls, than their U.S. or Canadian counterparts. The
federal governments of Canada and the U.S. respectively collect
40 and 51 percent of total tax revenues. The federal govern-
ments of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, on the other
hand, respectively collect 84.8, 70.3, 84, and 97.4 percent of the
total tax revenues." The Argentine federal government trans-
fers to the provincial and municipal governments 26 and 6.1 per-
cent of its total tax revenues, providing for 68 percent of provin-
cial tax receipts and 45 percent of municipal tax receipts. 5' In
Mexico, the federal government distributes to the states and
municipalities only 19 percent and 1 percent respectively of the
federal tax revenues, keeping 80 percent for itself. As in Argenti-
na, the Mexican states are heavily dependent upon federal
grants, which provide most states with more than 80 percent
(and some more than 90 percent) of their total revenues." 6 In
Venezuela, the states have virtually no independent taxing au-
thority and are dependent upon constitutionally mandated
transfer payments from the federal government (the Situado
Constitucional). Prior to 1990, the Situado Constitucional was
fixed at 15 percent of the federal budget. This percentage has
been elevated by one percent a year, beginning with the 1990
budget, and will continue to rise until it reaches 20 percent. The
states are required to transfer to their municipalities a percent-
age of the Situado Constitucional, set at 10 percent for 1990 and
153. See Segundo V. Linares Quintana, Rgirmen Constitucional de las Relaciones
Econdmicas entre la Nacidn y las Provincias, [1992-Al L.L. 717, 723 (1992).
154. The percentages for Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela are taken from IMF
financial data in Rafael de La Cruz, Finanzas Pdblicas y Decentralizaci6n: La Teorla
Inacabada del Federalismo Fiscal, in FEDERALISMO FISCAL: EL COSTO DE LA
DECENTRALiZACI6N EN VENEZUELA 199, 228 (Rafael de la Cruz & Armando Barrios
eds. 1994). The percentage for Mexico is taken from IMF financial data in John
Bailey, Centralism and Political Change in Mexico: The Case of National Solidarity,
in TRANSFORMING STATE-SocIETY RELATIONS IN MEXICO 97, 105 (Wayne A. Cornelius,
Ann L. Craig & Jonathan Fox eds. 1994).
155. Calculated from data in de Ia Cruz, supra note 154, at 228.
156. "The Financial Problems of State Governments," Mexico & NAFTA Report 3
(Apr. 20, 1995).
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rising one percent a year until it reaches 20 percent.'57 On the
other hand, in Brazil, because of the extremely generous trans-
fer payments mandated in the 1988 Constitution, the federal
government controls only 36.5 percent of the tax revenues and
has 43.4 percent of the expenditure burden; the states receive
40.7 percent of the total revenues and have 43 percent of the
expenditure burden; and the municipalities have a free ride,
receiving 22.8 percent of total revenues, with an expenditure
burden of only 13.6 percent." This fiscal imbalance has been
one of the principal causes of the huge federal deficit, which has
fueled extremely high levels of inflation. In order to launch the
present stabilization plan, the Plano Real, Congress amended
the Constitution in 1994 to create an Emergency Social Fund
that changes the revenue sharing rules in the 1988 Constitution
for fiscal years 1994-1995. The result of this change is to trans-
fer an estimated nine billion dollars from state and local gov-
ernments to the federal government, which has helped to make
the plan thus far a huge success.'59 Making this change perma-
nent is one of the top priorities of President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso's constitutional reform package, which is presently
pending in the Brazilian Congress.
D. Protection of Individual Rights
1. United States
In the U.S., basic individual rights, which were set forth in
the first Ten Amendments (the Bill of Rights) to the Federal
Constitution, originally were guaranteed only against actions of
the federal government."6 By a process called "selective incor-
157. Ley Orginica de decentralizaci6n, delimitaci6n y transferencia de
competencias del Poder Piiblico, arts. 13 and 14 (G.O. No. 4.153 Extraordinary of
Dec. 28, 1989).
158. Anwar Shah, The New Fiscal Federalism in Brazil 18 (World Bank Discus-
sion Paper No. 124, 1991).
159. Keith S. Rosenn, Federative Republic of Brazil Supplement, CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE WORLD (Gilbert H. Flanz ed., Release 95-1, Jan. 1995), which contains the
Portuguese and English translation of Constitutional Amendment of Revision No. 1
of Mar. 1, 1994.
160. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).
But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131
(1991); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).
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poration," the U.S. Supreme Court, on a case-by-case basis,
gradually has read most, but not all, of these guarantees into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making
them equally applicable to the states.'61 With the exception of
the 13th Amendment guarantee against involuntary servitude,
the constitutional guarantees of individual rights are deemed
applicable only against governmental actions and not against
private actions. 62
"States rights" has been a rallying cry for supporters of
maintenance of racial apartheid, as well as opponents of reform
of state criminal justice systems to ensure compliance with fed-
eral constitutional standards. It has also been a rallying cry of
those opposed to judicially mandated redistricting of state and
federal election districts to ensure compliance with the federal
requirement of "one man, one vote," as well as federal voting
rights legislation that interferes sharply with state autonomy
with respect to changing political districts, voting tests, and
methods of electing officials in states with prior histories of
racial discrimination in voting.
Despite certain significant exceptions, the primary source of
individual rights abuses has been state and local governments.
For the past four decades, the federal government has exerted
substantial pressure on states and municipalities to ensure
greater respect for individual rights. In recent years, however, at
least at the judicial level, the situation has been changing. As
the federal judiciary has become more conservative, some of the
state supreme courts have become more vigorous than the U.S.
Supreme Court in protecting certain individual rights."
161. The following guarantees have been held to have been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment: (1) First Amendment guarantees of free speech, religion,
and association; (2) the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search-
es and seizures; (3) the Fifth Amendment guarantees against double jeopardy, self-
incrimination,and taking of property without just compensation; (4) the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees of speedy trial, public trial, jury trial, notice of charges, confron-
tation of witnesses, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and right to counsel;
and (5) the Eight Amendment guarantees against excessive fines and cruel and un-
usual punishment. The relevant case law is cited in WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN
D. VARAT, CONSTrrUTiONAL LAW § 3, 511-13 (9th ed. 1993).
162. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 18-1 10-7, 1688-
1720 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, there are cases in which the Supreme Court has
deemed private action to be the functional equivalent of state action. See id. § 18-5,
1705-1711.
163. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
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2. Argentina
Argentina departed from the U.S. model with respect to
protection of individual rights. Argentina placed a bill of rights
within the body of its 1853 Constitution. From the beginning,
these rights have been regarded as guaranteed against both the
federal and provincial governments. Attempts to argue on the
basis of U.S. precedents that individual rights are protected only
vis-&-vis the federal government and not the provincial govern-
ments have been rejected by the Argentine Supreme Court."6
Since its creation by the Supreme Court in 1957, a summary
constitutional remedy called amparo may be brought against
acts or omissions of both public authorities and private parties
that injure constitutionally protected rights." s
3. Mexico
Since promulgation of the 1857 Constitution, Mexico's feder-
al courts have been entrusted with the task of protecting indi-
vidual rights against both federal and state authorities through
the summary remedy of amparo.1" The amparo, which func-
tions as habeas corpus to protect physical liberty, also protects
all other fundamental rights guaranteed by the first 29 articles
of the Constitution. Amparo may be brought only against acts or
omissions of a "responsible authority," defined by the Mexican
Supreme Court as "every person who, de jure or de facto, exercis-
es public power and is materially enabled thereby to operate as
an individual who commits public acts.. .167 The Mexican Su-
preme Court has developed a theory of dual personality for gov-
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977); Peter J. Galie, State Supreme Courts,
Judicial Federalism and other Constitutions, 71 JUDICATURE 100, 101 (Aug./Sept.
1987).
164. Hileret y Rodrfguez v. TucumAn, 98 Fallos 20 (1903); Pereyra Iraola v. Bue-
nos Aires, 138 Fallos 161 (1923).
165. Siri, 239 Fallos 459 (1957); Samuel Kot, S.R.L., 241 Fallos 291 (1958). The
amparo has subsequently been codified by law 16.986 of October 18, 1966, and COD.
PROC. Crv. Y COM., arts. 321, 498 (Arg.). See generally, NEiSTOR PEDRO SAGUES,
DERECHO PROCESAL CONsT'uCIoNAL: ACCION DE AMPARO (4th ed. 1995).
166. MEx. CONST. arts. 101 and 102 (1857), now MEX. CONST. arts. 103 and 107
(1917).
167. APENDICE DE JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA SUPREMA CORTE, TESIS 179, 360.
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ernmental agencies. If the agency is legislating, judging, or exe-
cuting laws, its acts are those of a responsible authority and
may be checked by amparo. If, however, the governmental agen-
cy is exercising the government's patrimonial rights, it is acting
as a private party. Paradoxically, in such cases, the complainant
in an amparo suit can be a governmental agency and may bring
amparo against certain decisions by authorities, such as expro-
priation awards or labor indemnities that must be paid out of
the government's patrimony.16
4. Brazil
In Brazil, both state and federal courts have responsibility
for the protection of individual rights. Brazil has a variety of
procedural devices to protect constitutional rights. Some kinds of
actions may be brought only in the Federal Supreme Court;
others may be brought in the state courts or federal courts,
depending upon whether the rights are allegedly being deprived
by federal or state authorities. The writ of security (mandado de
seguranga), a summary remedy used to protect constitutional
rights unprotected by habeas corpus, may only be brought
against public authorities or individuals with functions delegat-
ed by the government.1"
5. Canada
Canada adopted a Bill of Rights in 1960 as a statutory rath-
er than a constitutional instrument. This statute provided that
no federal statute could violate the human rights protected
therein. Not until 1982 were individual rights constitutionalized
in a document called the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.170
The Charter guarantees individual rights against both the feder-
al and provincial governments. Yet Canada has retained the doc-
168. Id., TEsiS 451, p. 875; Id., TFSIS 450, pp. 872-74; Josd Guidiio Pelayo,
Hacia una teorta del acto reclamado en materia del Juicio de Amparo, 2 REv. JUR.
JALISCIENSE 11, 14 (No. 2, Jan.-Apr. 1992).
169. See Rosenn, supra note 101.
170. See generally, CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS COMMENTARY
(Walter S. Tarnopolsky & Gdrald-A. Beaudoin eds., 1982).
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trine of parliamentary supremacy by permitting either the feder-
al or provincial legislatures to override the fundamental rights
secured in this Charter. The Charter contains a "notwithstand-
ing" clause that allows either federal or provincial legislatures to
override the individual constitutional rights.' Nevertheless,
the federal legislature has not used the overriding clause power
to overturn Supreme Court decisions declaring statutes uncon-
stitutional for violation of constitutionally secured human
rights. 7 ' The provinces, however, have on occasion used the
override power to prevent provincial legislation from judicial
invalidation under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
6. Venezuela
In Venezuela, individual rights are protected by the federal
courts against both federal and state authorities. Procedurally,
this protection usually takes the form of habeas corpus for phys-
ical liberty and amparo for other rights and guarantees. In addi-
tion, individual rights are protected by infringement from pri-
vate individuals by ordinary judicial means."'
IV. THE CENTRALIZATION OF FEDERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
The text of the constitutions of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and Venezuela suggests that these countries have federal sys-
tems that resemble the U.S. and Canada. But the reality is quite
different. Political power has been so heavily centralized in the
national governments, particularly in the executive, that, with
the exception of Brazil, the states or provinces have minimal au-
tonomy. On the other hand, the power of the central govern-
ments has not always penetrated into the interior of these coun-
tries, which traditionally have been ruled by local large land-
holders or caudillos. "[A] strong de facto system of local rule
emerged in Latin America, despite what the laws or constitu-
tions proclaimed.""'"
171. CAN. CONST. ACT art. 33 (1982).
172. Massey, supra note 89, at 1267.
173. BREwER-C WAS, supra note 104, at 300-301; OTto MARiN GOMEZ, LA
PRorEccI(N PROCESAL DE LAS GUARANTiAS CONSTITUCIONALES DE VENEZUELA.
AMPARO Y HABEAS CoRPus 229-254 (1983).
174. Howard J. Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline, Government Machinery and the Role
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A. Argentina
On paper, Argentine federalism closely resembles that of the
U.S. This is not surprising, since about two-thirds of Argentina's
Constitution was copied from that of the U.S. Political authority
is divided between the national government and twenty-three
semi-autonomous provinces. Each province has its own constitu-
tion, executive, legislature, and court system. In actual practice,
however, this system differs dramatically from the theoretical
conception. The national government almost totally dominates
the provinces. Constitutional provisions designed to assure pro-
vincial autonomy have been easily brushed aside by federal
intervention under Article 6, which authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to intervene in the territory of the provinces to guaran-
tee a republican form of government. Article 6 has been used
and abused, allowing the federal government carte blanche to
assume total control over any province at any time. This provi-
sion, which was taken from the U.S. Constitution, has fallen
into disuse in the U.S. In Argentina, on the other hand, it is
used continually, usually by the Executive. According to one
count, by 1962 Argentina had more than 220 federal interven-
tions, more than 150 of which were ordered by the Execu-
tive. '75 In the first four years of his government, the current
president, Carlos Menem, has used this power to place four of
the twenty-three provinces under federal trusteeship. 76 Gener-
ally, mere threat of intervention suffices to secure provincial
compliance with the wishes of the federal government. More-
over, the provinces lack fiscal autonomy, leaving them depen-
dent upon the federal government for financial assistance. Even
at the federal level power is heavily centralized in the presiden-
cy, which dominates both the Legislature and the Judiciary.
of the State, in LATIN AMERIcAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT 81, 90 (Howard J.
Wiarda & Harvey F. Kline eds., 3d ed. 1990).
175. JORGE I. GARCiA, EL FEDERALISMO ARGENTINO, cited in HUMBERTO QUIROGA
LAVIE, DERECHO CONSTIUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 391 (1991).
176. Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina:
Partial Failure or Qualified Success, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 87-89 (1993).
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B. Brazil
For the first 65 years of its existence, Brazil had a unitary
system of government under a constitutional monarchy. The
First Republic (1889-1930) adopted a constitution heavily influ-
enced by the U.S. that changed the unitary state into a federa-
tion of 20 states with substantial autonomy. The 1891 Constitu-
tion worked badly and was characterized by widespread electoral
fraud. Getdilio Vargas, who ruled the country as a dictator from
1930 to 1945, strongly centralized political power in the national
executive. The return of democracy in the brief period from 1946
to 1964 permitted significantly more autonomy for state and lo-
cal government, but military rule from 1964 to 1985 resulted in
strong centralization of power at the expense of the states and
counties. This was accomplished in large part by concentrating
the bulk of the taxing power in the federal government.'77 In
1988, after the return of democracy, a new constitution was
adopted that substantially restructured allocation of tax reve-
nues from the federal government to the states and counties.178
The new constitution has revitalized Brazilian federalism by
transferring substantial power from the federal government to
state and local governments. It also has substantially reallocated
power from the Executive to the Legislature.' Congress is
currently considering several proposed constitutional amend-
ments, including one that provides for permanent reallocation of
federal tax revenues in favor of the federal government.
C. Mexico
In theory, federalism has been the Mexican form of political
organization since its first constitution in 1822, when there were
twenty-two states. Article 40 of the Mexican Constitution char-
acterizes the country as a "representative, democratic, and feder-
177. See LuIs ROBERTO BARROSO, DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL BRASILEIRO: 0
PROBLEMA DA FEDERAcAO 32-107 (1982).
178. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
179. See Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient
Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773 (1990); Wayne
A. Selcher, A New Start Toward a More Decentralized Federalism in Brazil, 19
PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 167 (Summer 1989).
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al republic formed by free and sovereign states in all manners
concerning their internal governments, but united in a stabilized
federation ... ." Article 124, modeled after the 10th Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, provides that the powers of the federal
government are limited to those specifically delineated, the re-
mainder being reserved for the states. 80 But Mexico, like Ar-
gentina, suffers from what the late Carlos Nino called
"hyperpresidentialism." Virtually all real political power is con-
centrated in the federal government, and more precisely in the
hands of the president and the PRI."'5 Decentralization did in-
crease somewhat in the six years under President Salinas,'82
but what Jorge Carpizo wrote in 1973 is essentially true today:
"A good part of the federated states' autonomy is under central
will. In this fashion, what really exists in Mexico is a centralized
government with some decentralized aspects."1"
D. Venezuela
Venezuelan constitutions, following the tradition begun in
1811 and reinforced in 1863, have established a federal state.
Gradually, this federal state became more and more centralized.
The 1961 Constitution, which is currently in effect, has been
aptly termed "The Centralist Constitution with Federalist Fring-
es." " The breadth of the powers granted to the federal govern-
ment have left the states with fairly minimal powers. Even the
powers to tax and to operate their own judiciaries have been de-
nied to them. Moreover, the states have had quite limited polit-
ical autonomy. Until December 1989, the state governors were
freely selected and removed by the President of the Republic.
This excessive centralism led to demands for political re-
180. For a discussion of the exceptions to this constitutional rule, see Laura
Trigueros Gaisman, El Federalismo en Mexico Autonomia, Coordinacidn de las
Entidades Federales, in 1 DERECHO CONST[TUCIONAL COMPARADO MEXlCO-ESTADos
UNIDoS 217, 248-250 (James F. Smith ed., 1990).
181. Partido Revolucionario Institucional [Institutional Revolutionary Party].
182. See Kenneth M. Holland, Federalism in a North American Context: The
Contribution of the Supreme Courts of Canada, the United States and Mexico, in THE
CANADIAN & AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 87, 99-100
(Marian C. McKenna ed., 1993).
183. JORGE CARPIZO, FEDERALISMO EN LATINOAMERICA 78 (1973).
184. Tulio Chiossone, Constitucidn Centralista con Ribetes Federales, in 1
EsTuDIOs SOB E LA CONsTrrucION: LiBRO HOMENAJE A RAFAEL CALDERA 207 (1979).
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form. In 1989, the National Congress enacted an important law
on decentralization that progressively transfers to the states
concurrent powers over services that the federal government had
assumed, such as planning, protection of the family, education,
culture, sports, employment, health, promotion of agriculture,
industry and commerce, protection of the environment, the or-
dering of territory, protection of the consumer, popular housing,
and public works."s The initiative for these transfers must
come from the state governors, who are to request transfer of
personnel, budget, equipment, and services from the federal
government for social and economic programs. Thus far, only six
states have begun the process. No coherent plan has yet been
formulated for these transfers, which are being negotiated piece-
meal between federal ministries and various state govern-
ments." These transfers have already resulted in a significant
increase in state powers and a more meaningful federalism."7
V. THE LESSONS OF THESE SIX EXPERIENCES IN FEDERALISM
Federalism is critical to international economic integration.
Many of the same problems that these six countries have faced
are precisely the problems that confront multinational pacts like
the European Common Market, Caribbean Common Market,
MERCOSUR, and NAFTA."' Neither NAFTA, which in-
cludes the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, nor MERCOSUR, which
includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, have yet set
up the kind of transnational legislative, executive or judicial
organs that have been created by the European Economic Com-
munity, but such organs eventually may become necessary. In
any event, implementation of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, as well
185. Ley Orgfnica de decentralizaci6n, delimitaci6n y transferencia de
competencias del Poder Pdblico de 28 dec. 1989, discussed in ALLAN R. BREWER-
CARIAS, PRINCIPIOS DEL REGIMEN JURiDICO DE LA ORGANIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA
VENEZOLANA 72-74 (1991).
186. Allan Angell & Carol Graham, Can Social Sector Reform Make Adjustment
Sustainable and Equitable? Lessons from Chile and Venezuela, 27 J. LAT. AM. STUD.
189, 214-215 (1995).
187. See Ellner, supra note 1; Isabel BoscAn de Ruesta & Gustavo Urdaneta
Troconis, El Federalismo Venezolano y la &leciente Descentralizacidn Territorial, 47
REV. DER. PUB. 5 (1991); Roberto Delgado Salazar, El nuevo rMgimen legal de los
estados y municipios, 43 REV. FAC. DER. DE UNIV. CAT. ANDRES BELLO 111 (1991).
188. Mercado Comdn del Cono Sur [Common Market of the Southern Cone].
189. North American Free Trade Agreement.
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as the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), are already redefining the nature of federalism
for the next century by limiting the sovereignty of states and
provinces to implement consumer, labor, land use, tax, alcoholic
beverages, licensing fees, procurement policies, and environmen-
tal legislation deemed unnecessary obstacles to international
trade and investment.
19
There is no magical formula for federalism. There are myri-
ad ways to allocate powers within federal systems. One need
only make sure that certain essential powers are given to the
central government, such as common defense, foreign affairs,
and the regulation of interstate and international commerce,
and that both the federal and regional governments have con-
current or joint powers to tax and to spend. Whether the federal
government or the states have the residual powers does not
seem critical. Indeed, the experiences of all six countries suggest
that their constitutional texts do little to explain the historical
evolution of these federalist systems. Regardless of how powers
are allocated, federal systems will experience tension between
demands for greater state autonomy and demands for greater
centralization.
Federalism can be a technique for centralizing or decentral-
izing governmental power. In the U.S. and Canada, federalism
was utilized to integrate formerly autonomous colonies into a
single nation. In Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela feder-
alism was utilized to decentralize former colonies that had been
highly centralized. To this day, the U.S. and Canada have re-
mained less centralized than the Latin American Republics. One
consequence of the greater decentralization has been serious
problems with threats of secession.
Federalism requires an independent judiciary to "umpire"
the system. At a minimum, the judiciary needs to be able to
declare state legislation invalid because of conflicts with the
federal constitution or statutes. Despite the formal guarantees of
190. See Conrad Weiler, Foreign-Trade Agreements: A New Federal Partner, 24
PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM 113, 123-128 (Summer 1994); Pete du Pont,
Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will States Exist?, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol'y 137, 143-144 (1993); Campbell, A Canadian Labor Perspective on a North
American Free Trade Agreement, in THE NORTH AMERcAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
LABOR, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES 62 (Bognanno & Ready eds. 1993).
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judicial independence, Latin American judiciaries historically
have been far too dependent upon the other branches of govern-
ment to perform this function adequately. They also have had
considerable difficulty in adequately protecting individual rights,
in part because of the heavy centralization of power. Entrusting
the umpiring function to the Federal Executive or Congress has
led to a massive centralization of the powers of the central gov-
ernment at the expense of the states.
Federalism is not much of a bulwark against tyranny. Fed-
eralism has been an insignificant barrier to dictatorships in the
Latin American federal republics. Moreover, the U.S. experience
suggests that the federal government, not the state govern-
ments, has frequently been far more vigilant in protecting the
rights of minorities.
Federalism involves an ongoing process of political conflict
and compromise. Political checks as well as judicial checks need
to be built into the system. States need to be adequately repre-
sented in the federal legislature so that the normal political
processes will assure respect for the federal structure. The U.S.
Senate, where each state has the same number of senators, has
been better at fulfilling this function than the Canadian Senate,
whose members are appointed for life by the federal govern-
ment. Yet even in systems where each state is equally repre-
sented by elected representatives in the federal Senate, there is
considerable skepticism as to whether the political constraints of
federalism actually function.19'
The evolution of federalism is not a unilinear process that
inevitably leads to progressive centralization. While five of the
six American federalist republics have evolved towards greater
centralization, Canada has evolved in the other direction. More-
over, the evolutionary process has been cyclical- rather than
unilinear.
At present, the most critical problem of federalism is finan-
cial. Without sufficient financial independence, state autonomy
quickly disappears. Effective federalism requires that both the
federal and state governments have adequate and independent
tax bases. Some aggrandizement of federal power through at-
191. See Martha Derthick, The Structural Protections of American Federalism, in
COMPARATVE FEDERALISM, supra note 4, at 9, 12-23.
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taching conditions to federal grants to the states is inevitable,
but limits on such conditional spending are necessary in a genu-
ine federal system. In all six countries, the federal governments
are attempting to cut back sharply on federal spending and to
transfer responsibility for social programs to the states and
provinces. Increasingly, the problems of federalism are becoming
problems of how tax revenues are shared between the states and
the federal government, and how the societal responsibilities
that are transferred from federal governments to the states will
be funded.
Federal systems "are most successful in societies with the
human resources to fill many public offices competently and
with material resources plentiful enough to allow a measure of
economic waste in payment for the luxury of liberty."9 2 With-
out large cadres of relatively well-educated and well-paid civil
servants to staff the multiple layers of bureaucracy, federalism
is unlikely to function well.
Finally, form does not matter as much as substance. None of
the federal systems of the Americas closely follows the allocation
of powers laid down in its constitution. Federalism is no substi-
tute for competent and honest political leadership. Alexander
Pope's couplet makes the point succinctly:
For forms of government let fools contest; whate'er is best
administered is best. 193
192. Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism, 5-6 INT'L ENCY. SOC. SCI. 353, 265 (David L.
Sills ed., 1968).
193. AN ESSAY ON MAN, Ep. iii, 1.303 (1733), cited in THE OXFORD DIcTIoNARY
OF QUOTATIONS 379 (3d. ed. 1980).
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